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As outposts of the British Empire, the various state parliaments of
Australia, and New Zealand as a whole, inherited the Westminster
system of government. All of them copied the structure of the UK
Parliament in having an elected lower house, in which government
is formed, and an unelected house of review, largely composed of
those from the propertied classes.
In little under two hundred years, these parliaments have
undergone a range of reforms, including democratisation of their
upper houses. Two jurisdictions, however, took bolder steps: the
Australian state of Queensland, and New Zealand, both demolished their upper houses
entirely. They remain the only jurisdictions in the antipodes without houses of review.
In this short piece we outline the history of these two jurisdictions and discuss what light
they can shed on the merits (or otherwise) of bicameralism, and consider whether
parliamentary committees, or alternative voting systems, can sufficiently compensate for
the lack of a second parliamentary chamber.
Unicameralism in Queensland
After coming to power in 1915, the Labor government viewed Queensland’s upper house
(the ‘Legislative Council’) as inimical to its legislative agenda. In 1917 a bill was introduced
to abolish it. Unsurprisingly, Legislative Council members refused to concur with their own
political annihilation. Subsequently the government took the issue to a public referendum:
but once again, the proposal failed, with roughly 63% of voters rejecting it. Undeterred, the
government finally succeeded on its third try, this time by stacking the Legislative Council
(an appointed chamber) with 14 loyalists to the government’s cause. The Council voted
itself out of existence on November 3, 1921.
In the decades since, Queensland has experienced long periods of what we call elective
dictatorship, under governments of various political stripes. By ‘elective dictatorship’ we
mean simply that governmental power has been concentrated in the hands of a small
group of individuals, whose stranglehold on Parliament, and over their colleagues, gives
them a virtual carte blanche.[1] This is as a result of a single-member electoral system that
tends to deliver large parliamentary majorities, and a tight system of party control that
ensures MPs are unlikely to criticise their colleagues, for fear of disendorsement at the
next election (which spells almost certain electoral defeat) and the loss of any chance of
joining the ministry or upper echelons of the governing party. These factors combine to
ensure that the deliberative and investigative functions of parliament – over both proposed
legislation and the conduct of the executive – are seriously impeded.
In the 1970s and 80s, police corruption in Queensland flourished. A landmark report into
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this corruption was delivered in 1989. The report recommended a suite of reforms,
including the establishment of a comprehensive system of parliamentary committees.
These committees have provided some additional oversight and scrutiny, but have
ultimately failed to meet expectations for a number of reasons. Firstly, committees have
proved vulnerable to the ability of government to declare a bill ‘urgent’, and by-pass the
committee system altogether. Secondly, governments have control over the composition
and agenda of committees (e.g. in appointing chairs and setting terms of reference) and
can limit the time given for them to report. Thirdly, because of the large majority of seats
often held by government under the lower house’s voting system (88% of seats are
currently held by the government), the number of MPs with an incentive to take their
scrutiny role seriously is limited. Fourthly, committees remain at the whim of the
government and can be abolished if the government considers it to their advantage.
In our view, the committee system adopted in Queensland does not adequately
compensate for the lack of a second chamber.
Unicameralism in New Zealand
The story of the abolition of New Zealand’s Legislative Council is similar. The chamber
came to be viewed as antiquated and ineffectual, and in 1950 the National Party introduced
the Legislative Council Abolition Bill. To ensure its passage through the upper house, 25
new members, known as the ‘suicide squad’, were appointed by the government to do their
bidding. The Bill passed, and the Council was abolished on the 1  January 1951.
Voter disenchantment with New Zealand’s electoral system grew over the ensuing
decades. New Zealand’s first-past-the-post voting system consistently delivered large
majorities to governments, and did not ensure parliamentary representation that matched
the views of the electorate. For example, in both the 1978 and 1981 general elections, the
National Party won government despite the major opposition party, the Labour Party,
obtaining more votes overall. The Social Credit Party was also able to secure only one seat
out of 92 in parliament, despite obtaining 16.1% of the vote in 1978. Another factor was
that both major parties, during their time in government, instituted reforms that had not
been flagged before their election, or had even been specifically disavowed. This
confluence of factors led to disillusionment with the political system as a whole, and in the
1981 and 84 campaigns the Labour Party promised to set up a Royal Commission to
investigate possible changes to the electoral system. The Commission was established in
1985. Its key recommendation was the adoption of a mixed-member proportional (MMP)
voting system, which was used in West Germany at the time. In 1993, the New Zealand
public approved the adoption of MMP at a referendum.
Has MMP ameliorated the downsides of New Zealand’s unicameral system of
government? In several ways it has. For example, power has been diffused as a result of
the coalition arrangements that are usually necessary to form government: only recently,
and against the general trend, has a single party obtained enough seats to govern in its own
right. The broader spectrum of representation has increased the number of alternative
perspectives and thereby improved legislative deliberation and public debate. However,
whilst MMP has been an improvement, it remains second best to a house of review. As in
st
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Queensland, governments (albeit usually coalitions) in New Zealand have used emergency
motions to bypass committee scrutiny and railroad legislation without due consideration.
There is also opportunity for manipulation of the committee process. For example, in
relation to the proposed Foreshore and Seabed Bill 2004 , the Minister responsible referred
the Bill to the Fisheries Committee instead of the Maori Affairs Committee, in order to
achieve the government’s desired outcome.
The fundamental problem, which MMP has not resolved, is that those with power have little
reason to ensure its fair exercise. Although government may be harder to achieve in New
Zealand – and coalition parties may withdraw their support – these parties, when in
government, share the spoils of office: they hold ministerial positions and enjoy a degree of
influence which they could not if they were to criticise their dominant partner and withdraw
their support. In those circumstances, minor support parties have a strong incentive to not
criticise the government.
MMP’s achievement of broader democratic representation and improved deliberative
capacity has been a welcome improvement in New Zealand. But it has not proved sufficient
as a check on the exercise of executive and legislative power.[2]
What do upper houses achieve?
A key advantage of upper houses is that they provide a forum for deliberation and debate
that is beyond the control of the government. In jurisdictions that lack a mixed-proportional
or proportional system of voting – like Queensland – an upper house elected on a more
proportional basis also enhances the representative nature of parliament, by better
reflecting the community’s broad spectrum of views.[3]
A lower house elected through preferential voting in single-member electorates, and an
upper house elected through proportional representation, achieves the best of both worlds:
stability in the lower house (with MPs responsible to smaller groups of voters), and
diversity in the upper. Obstruction occasionally occurs, but various mechanisms exist to
enable the resolution of deadlocks. On the whole, governments are usually able to broker
reasonable compromises and get most of their legislative agenda through parliament.
One of the most important functions of upper houses is to inquire into legislation and
administration. High-quality upper houses tend to develop a distinct political culture as a
sober chamber of review that is less partisan than the lower house. Members typically
enjoy longer terms than do those in the lower house and are less likely to serve as
ministers. They are equipped to conduct investigations on policy issues (e.g. though
hearing expert evidence, producing reports etc.), and have extensive powers to shed light
on the executive by compelling the attendance of witnesses for questioning, and the
production of documents and other evidence.
Non-parliamentary institutions undoubtedly play an important role in democracies – a free
media and effective anti-corruption bodies are both vital. But they are not sufficient.[4] The
media generally have an interest in the sensational – but little interest in the minutiae of
legislative provisions, or complex policy questions on drier subjects (like infrastructure and
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taxation), which are the bread and butter work of legislatures. And while crime bodies can
put politicians who abuse their privileges behind bars, they cannot ensure that they pass
well-drafted laws, or make policies that best advance the national (or state) interest.
Woodrow Wilson once wrote that, “The only really self-governing people is that people
which discusses and interrogates its administration.” When parliaments are under the
absolute control of executive governments, neither committee systems nor diverse
electoral representation is sufficient to ensure adequate discussion or interrogation. If non-
parliamentary institutions are also not up to this task, then, in our view, the only real
solution is to build this capacity into parliament; in other words, to have a constitutionally
entrenched upper house elected on a different basis, whose assent is necessary for the
passage of any law.
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